'Context of Islam and Buddhist Fundamentalism Essay\r'

'At its some basic eyeshot constitutionalism implies attention to the spectral fundawork forcetals. According to Martin Marty, groups who feel themselves to be at risk in society return key to sure sacred fundamentals as a method for twain staving off the attacks of modernity and for re maintaining their make place in a sacred history. Modernity, in this sense, is to be understood in the following context. First, it is to be seen as characterized by the rationalization of authority, and the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political regime by a single, secular, national political authority.\r\nSecond, it is to be seen as involving the differentiation of new political expires and the exploitation of specialized structure for the per do workance of these functions and third, it is to be seen as the ripening of increased participation in political relation throughout society. Modernity, in this sense, requires the development of a pluralistic society that enables the development of positive identities as fence to identities understood within the context of marginalized groups or communities. at bottom a modernist worldview, fundamentalism is thereby seen as a form of ideology, which refuses the consideration of other perspectives.\r\nIn relation to this, Marty contends, â€Å" multitude in such(prenominal) cultures [ fundamentalistic cultures] were threatened by the eating away or assault of what they considered to be ‘modern’” (276). In addition to this, he further states that such cultures thereby use fundamentalist tenets, as â€Å"instruments and weapons for reactivity where…the actual or presumed foundational elements of belief and practice, story and equity” ar utilized in guild to enable the â€Å" discriminating retrieval of the past” (Marty 277). If such is the case, fundamentalism may thereby be characterized with a trustworthy form of â€Å" judgm ent of conviction in the world of ‘postmodern relativism’” (Marty 377).\r\nHowever, such a conviction is generally misconstrued as enabling the development of an ill-considered actor and hence the performance of irrational actions. The practice of fundamentalism has generally been associated with religious belief hence unity is presented with the various forms of religious fundamentalisms such as Catholic fundamentalism, Islam fundamentalism and Buddhist fundamentalism to name a few. As was renowned above, such religious groups snap on the fundamental philosophical assurances of their religion which allows the selective retrieval of a real or presumed history which becomes the basis for fundamentalists’ actions.\r\n callable to this, it is generally fake that fundamentalists are privy to the allegiance of irrational actions. From the onset, it is important to none that such an assumption is based upon a misleading excogitation of the fundamentalis t movement. Furthermore, it is important to note that such a conception of fundamentalism is based on an perceptiveness of fundamentalism based on its function. In line with this, the task of this paper is two-fold. First, it aims to argue the practice of fundamentalism within Islam and Buddhism and second, it aims to consider the effects of these practices on the rights of the nonage members of such groups.\r\nIn order to be more specific, the paper will focus on the philosophical assumptions of such movements and how these assumptions de boundaryine and affect the rights of the minority members of such groups specifically that of women. As I reckon, an understanding of fundamentalism necessitates an understanding of it content since it is only through the abbreviation of fundamentalism’s content that ace may be able to present an accurate depiction of the congenital power of the ideas within the movement as come up as the relevance of the political actors’ norm ative commitments.\r\nsuch(prenominal) an understanding of fundamentalism does not necessarily replace the useable purpose of the ideas within the movement. However, in relation to this, I would like to contend that such an understanding of the movement, which necessitates the insulation of the function and means, fails to comprehend the dichotomy of meaning and function thereby failing to consider the correlation of meaning and function. Such a failure, on the other hand, leads to the pictorial matter of fundamentalism as form of ideology as inappropriate to a form of political philosophy.\r\nThis is evident if one considers Marty and Appleby’s understanding of fundamentalism. According to Marty and Appleby, the general attribute of fundamentalism presents the same movement as â€Å"reflecting upon the evocative and defining power of the sacred [in an attempt] to harness this power for…a variety of political, social and religious ends” (qtd in Henston 13 1). In this sense, fundamentalism may be understood as seeking to â€Å"reconsecrate the world” (Henston 131).\r\nIn relation to this Heston claims that Marty and Appleby considers fundamentalism as offering a specific â€Å"reading of veritable texts of the history [a particular(prenominal)] religion and peoples…hence fundamentalism appeals frequently…on sacred space that provides a concrete focus” (131). Such a depiction of fundamentalism with the emphasis on its religious character as well as its aim of reconsecration fails to consider that fundamentalism is characterized by the need for belong or for security.\r\nWithin Islam, it is generally assumed that the most common manifestation of fundamentalism can be seen in the position of the womanly per male child within society’s hierarchy of power. Holsdon and Rozario note that â€Å"Islam is necessarily more remote or more oppressive to women than other religions” (331). The cause for t his can be traced to the status given to the feminine by a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Shari’a. Mohammad, himself, describes Islam as â€Å"a religion of right-doing, right-thinking, and right-speaking founded on divine love, worldwide charity, and the equality of man in the sight of the shaper” (qtd in Syed 157).\r\nA literal interpretation of this enactment excludes the female person from the treatment of equality. Moghissi states, Regardless of the interpretation of the Qur’an and the Shari’a, if the Qur’anic operating instructions are taken literally, Islamic individuals or societies cannot party favor equal rights for women in the family or in certain areas of social life … If the principles of the Shari’a are to be maintained … women cannot enjoy equality before the law and in the law. (140â€1) The two most prominent examples of these in Islam can be seen in the allowance of polygamy as well a s the requirement that women should be obscure and secluded.\r\nOne might note that such conditions may be considered as fostering inequality within Islam religions as it places the female in a dependant position to the male however, it has also been argued that these do not necessarily lead to inequality within Islam. Agosin argues that such an assumption [that the conditions set within both the Qur’an and the Shari’a leads to female inequality] may be seen as a result of a patriarchal society’s dissembling of religion and culture (236). The function of this misrepresentation is to maintain women in a position that beaver serves patriarchal priorities.\r\nIt is important to contextualize such a claim within the basic assumption of Islam’s religious philosophy. The teachings of Islam are concentrated on the notions of faith and duty. The term Islam itself is equivalent to the concept of submission in the position language. Islam may thereby be seen as the religion of submission wherein one submits to the will of Allah as it is declared in the Qur’an. The problem is thereby presented when one considers the contrasted accounts regarding the treatment of the female as it is presented in the aforementioned text.\r\nThere are accounts which recognize the equality of both members of the sexes as well as accounts which places the female as a subordinate to the male. If such is the case, it cannot be argued that self-direction may not be granted to the female since a literal interpretation of the aforementioned texts allows instances of exemption on the side of the female. This, however, does not change the situation that Islam operates under the assumption of separate roles and spheres of activities for both men and women.\r\nAs opposed to Islam, the practice of fundamentalism may be seen in Buddhist religions in different forms depending on the form of Buddhism practiced by a particular group. In the same way that Islam adhe res to a certain form of separate-spheres ideology between men and women, Buddhism controls the female as a result of her dangerous sexual practice which is considered as potentially dangerous to men. In order to deal with such a problem, marriages are consistent for women at a young age in order to ensure their chastity.\r\nAccording to the traditional doctrine, embraced in Theravada movements, every woman must bear cardinal kinds of subordination. The first is â€Å"to her father when she is young, to her husband while she married, and to her son when she old” (qtd in Paul 53). Such a doctrine is enforced in reality is penalize with certain sanctions. A woman who fails to conform to this pass role is stigmatized and devalued within society. The similarity between Islam and Buddhism fundamentalist movements can traced to the value that they place upon the female subject.\r\nThis value however prevents the female’s acquisition of autonomy as a result of her assum ed natural subordination to the male. The effects of fundamentalism within these movements may thereby be seen as hindering and in fact enabling the subordination of the female. Works Cited Abu-Nimer, M. â€Å"A Framework for Non-violence and Peacebuilding in Islam. ” Journal of Law and righteousness 15. 2 (2001): 217-265. Agosin, Marjorie. Women, Gender, and Human Rights: A Global Perspective. capital of the United Kingdom: Rutgers, 2001. Hilsdon, Anne and Santi Rozario. â€Å"Special Issue on Islam, Gender, and Human Rights.\r\n” Women’s Studies International Forum 29 (2006): 331-338. Henston, A. â€Å"Crusades and Jihads: A long-term Economic Perspective. ” Annals of the American Academy of policy-making and Social Sciences 588 (2003): 112-135. Marty, M. â€Å"The Future of World Fundamentalism. ” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 142. 3 (1998): 367-77. Paul, Diane. Women in Buddhism: images of the womanly in Mahayana Traditio n. Syed, Ameer. The Spirit of Islam Or the Life and Teachings of Mohammad: Or the Life and Teachings of Mohammed. Np: Gorgias Press, 2002.\r\n'